1. Introduction {#s0005}
===============

The benefits and costs of globalization have been in debate for years, and the U.S.-China trade dispute since 2018 and the recent breakout of the global Covid-19 crisis provide further momentum to rethink them. According to the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, the globalization index has increased by about 45% in the past 30 years.[1](#fn0005){ref-type="fn"} Following this general trend, many banks are expanding their business to other countries to "follow their clients" or seek more profitability or diversification. Foreign bank assets account for 42% of total bank assets in the host countries in 2013, and the average proportion of foreign banks in host countries increased from 29% in 1995 to 48% in 2013.[2](#fn0010){ref-type="fn"} The global financial crisis originating from the United States in 2008 has heightened the interest of researchers, bank supervisors, and government officials in the impact of this globalization of the banking sector.

It is often argued that the entry of foreign banks increases competition in the host country, which in turn changes the behavior and performance of incumbent local banks. To protect domestic banks from foreign competition, most if not all countries are cautious in liberalizing their banking sector and have various restrictions in place to limit foreign presence. This study tries to answer the question, does foreign bank entry really increase bank competition in the host country? What role does the bank regulatory and institutional framework play in this relationship? Studies investigating this link are mostly regional or country specific, and no consensus has been reached. The present study covers 148 developed and developing countries over 1987--2015,[3](#fn0015){ref-type="fn"} exploring factors that may contribute to the heterogeneity among them in the effect of foreign bank entry on competition.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. [Section 2](#s0010){ref-type="sec"} reviews the literature, [Section 3](#s0015){ref-type="sec"} describes the data and method, [Section 4](#s0050){ref-type="sec"} discusses the empirical results, and [Section 5](#s0085){ref-type="sec"} concludes.

2. Literature review {#s0010}
====================

The impact of foreign banks on host countries has been examined from different perspectives. Some studies investigate how bank performance (e.g., profitability, efficiency, net interest margin) is affected by foreign bank entry. [@bb0095], examining 80 countries from 1988 to 1995, find that the presence of foreign banks reduces the profitability and net interest margin of domestic banks. [@bb0120], looking at 169 nations over 1998--2013, observes that foreign bank presence is associated with lower profit efficiency but higher cost efficiency. Most other studies focus on a specific nation. [@bb0190] investigate the impact of foreign bank entry on bank efficiency in Australia and find that bank efficiency increased during the post deregulation period of 1988--2001; they argue that the competition resulting from the diversity in bank types is important in prompting efficiency improvements. [@bb0035] study the relationship between bank ownership and efficiency in China and find that foreign banks are most efficient. They suggest that minority foreign ownership of the largest four state-owned banks in China will likely improve performance significantly.[4](#fn0020){ref-type="fn"}

Another strand of studies focuses on the impact of bank globalization on financial stability. Using detailed data on U.S. banks, [@bb0075] find that the existence of an active internal capital market in global banks contributes to the international propagation of shocks. [@bb0210], looking at 129 countries over 1995--2013, observes increased bank risk in countries that host foreign banks. [@bb0080], studying 32 emerging economies over 2000--2013, find that foreign-owned banks take on more risk than their domestic counterparts. Analyzing bank-level data from 35 emerging countries over 2000--2014, [@bb0200] observe that foreign bank presence increases the risk of domestic banks. However, [@bb0215] find that foreign acquisition reduces the risk taking of state-owned banks in China. Other studies examine the impact of bank globalization on other aspects of the host country economy, such as employment (e.g., [@bb0010]), macroeconomic growth (e.g., [@bb0060]), and institutional development (e.g., [@bb0155]).

Intuitively, one would expect foreign bank entry to increase host country competition, and researchers frequently claim that this is one channel through which foreign banks affect the performance of domestic banks. However, this channel is not sufficiently scrutinized in the literature, and no consensus has been reached from the limited evidence. Among the few studies, [@bb0125] find that foreign bank penetration enhances bank competition, measured with [@bb0170] H statistics, in Asia and Latin America over 1997--2008. [@bb0065] both theoretically and empirically analyzes the effect of international banking on market structures in the banking industry in OECD countries over 1995--2009, and finds that both cross-border lending and bank foreign direct investment reduce bank concentration and increase the contestability of the host countries. In contrast, [@bb0205] examine the impact of the accelerated foreign penetration in Latin American countries in the 1990s and find that it decreased competition there. Country case studies also find conflicting evidence. [@bb0160] argue that foreign bank entry may not stimulate competition because foreign banks adopt rent-seeking strategies when entering the Mexican market through mergers and acquisitions. [@bb0165] observe that foreign banks, particularly foreign de novo banks, behave more competitively than local banks in the Indonesian banking market, and their penetration is therefore important in creating a contestable market. This conflicting evidence warrants another study.

3. Data and method {#s0015}
==================

3.1. Data {#s0020}
---------

The bank-level data I use are retrieved from Bankscope and screened with the following criteria. (1) To avoid double counting, if consolidated and unconsolidated information are both reported in the dataset, I include only the consolidated information. (2) I keep only countries with at least 50 bank-year observations and at least 5 banks in a given year. (3) I keep only commercial banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks, representing about 71%, 14%, and 15% of the sample respectively. (4) In calculating a control variable for bank risk (the Z score), I use only banks with at least four consecutive years of data. (5) I exclude observations that lack information for basic variables or have obvious data errors (e.g., negative values for total assets, loans, overhead costs, etc.). The final sample comprises 23,175 banks in 148 countries over 1987--2015. To mitigate the impact of outliers I winsorize all variables at the 1% level. While most variables are ratios, the bank-level variables expressed as amounts are in million U.S. dollars.

The country-level data include information about foreign bank presence, macroeconomic condition, market structure, governance, economic cycle, and regulatory and institutional framework. Since the availability of these data varies, the year and bank coverage of the final dataset changes with the variables included in the regressions.

3.2. Baseline model {#s0025}
-------------------

This cross-country study provides insight into the average relationship between foreign bank entry and host countries\' bank competition for the set of countries under investigation. The basic model is specified as follows:$$\mathit{Competition}_{i,j,t} = c + \beta \bullet \mathit{foreign\ presence}_{j,t} + \gamma \bullet X_{i,j,t - 1} + \theta \bullet Y_{j,t} + \mathit{year\ dummies} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t},$$where *i*, *j*, and *t* index bank, country, and time respectively. The vector *X* ~*i*,\ *j*,\ *t*−1~ represents a series of bank-specific variables, including bank size, capital adequacy, asset structure, risk, asset growth, profitability, and efficiency. *Y* ~*j*,\ *t*~ is a vector of country-specific variables, including measures of market structure (the Herfindahl-Hirschman index or HHI), financial development (stock market capitalization), macroeconomic conditions (GDP per capita and GDP growth), and governance (rule of law). To mitigate the potential endogeneity issue, I use 1-year lag terms for all bank-level variables.[5](#fn0025){ref-type="fn"} β measures the link between foreign bank presence and host country bank competition. The error term is clustered at bank level, and year fixed effect is included in the regressions.

3.3. Measurement of variables {#s0030}
-----------------------------

### 3.3.1. Banking market competition measure {#s0035}

Some studies use concentration as an inverse measure of competition. This practice is based on the structure conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis, which argues that greater concentration in the market fosters collusion among banks, reducing competition. Some examples include the *n*-bank concentration ratio (the market share of the *n* largest banks) and the HHI (the sum of the squares of bank market shares).

Instead of inferring the competitive conduct of banks from the analysis of market structure, other studies gauge market competition with the elasticity of output price to marginal costs (the Lerner index), the elasticity of revenue to marginal costs ([@bb0170] H statistics), or the elasticity of profits to marginal costs (the Boone indicator).[6](#fn0030){ref-type="fn"}

In this paper, I use the Lerner index, which measures a bank\'s market power by calculating the deviation between output price and marginal costs, with higher values indicating higher market power of a bank and less bank competition. Compared to the HHI, *n*-bank concentration ratio, H statistics, and Boone indicator, the Lerner index has several advantages. First, it varies at the bank level across time, while all the other competition measures (except bank market share) gauge bank industry competition at the country level. Second, as [@bb0030] argue, "the Lerner index captures both the impact of pricing power on the asset and funding side of the bank." Third, unlike market share or the market concentration measures of competition, the Lerner index need not define the market geographically, an advantage that is especially important now that banks are expanding their businesses across borders. In addition, although studies espousing the SCP hypothesis use bank concentration as a proxy for bank competition (e.g., [@bb0130]), [@bb0185] point out that competition and concentration capture different characteristics of banking systems.

The Lerner index is calculated as follows:$$\mathit{Lerner}_{i,t} = \frac{P_{i,t} - \mathit{MC}_{i,t}}{P_{i,t}},$$where *i* and *t* index bank and year, respectively. *P* ~*i*,\ *t*~ is the price of bank *i* at time *t*, and is estimated as the ratio of total operating income to total assets, whereas *MC* ~*i*,\ *t*~, the marginal costs of bank *i* at time *t*, is obtained from an estimated translog cost function with respect to output. I follow the literature (e.g., [@bb0005]; [@bb0030]; [@bb0040]) and model the total operating cost of running the bank as a function of a single, aggregate output proxy, *Q* ~*i*,\ *t*~, and three input prices, *w* ~*i*,\ *t*~ ^*j*^, with *j* ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The translog cost function is specified as follows:$$\ln C_{i,t} = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1}\ln Q_{i,t} + \alpha_{2}\left( {\ln Q_{i,t}} \right)^{2} + \sum\limits_{j = 1}^{3}\beta_{j}\ln w_{i,t}^{j} + \sum\limits_{j = 1}^{3}\sum\limits_{k = 1}^{3}\beta_{j,k}\ln w_{i,t}^{j}\ln w_{i,t}^{k} + \sum\limits_{j = 1}^{3}\gamma_{j}\ln w_{i,t}^{j}\ln Q_{i,t} + \upsilon_{t} + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$where *C* ~*i*,\ *t*~ measures total operating costs (total interest and noninterest expenses),[7](#fn0035){ref-type="fn"} and *Q* ~*i*,\ *t*~ represents a proxy for bank output (total assets). The three input prices *w* ~*i*,\ *t*~ include the price of fixed assets ($w_{1} = \frac{\mathit{noninterest\ expenses}}{\mathit{total\ assets}}$), the price of labor ($\left. w_{2} = \frac{\mathit{personnel\ expenses}}{\mathit{total\ assets}} \right)$, and the price of borrowed funds ($\left. w_{3} = \frac{\mathit{interest\ expenses}}{\mathit{total\ deposits}\&\mathit{money\ market\ funding}} \right)$. I estimate the cost function for each country separately over the sample period to reflect potential differences in technology and/or institutional environment. Time dummies and bank specialization dummies are also included to capture technological progress and business cycle variations, and the unobserved features associated with different bank types. In addition, the following restrictions are imposed to ensure homogeneity of degree one in input prices:$$\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{3}\beta_{j} = 1,\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{3}\gamma_{j} = 0,\text{and}\forall k \in \left\{ {1,2,3} \right\}:\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{3}\beta_{j,k} = 0.$$

The marginal cost is then obtained as follows:$$\mathit{MC}_{\mathit{it}} = \frac{\partial C_{i,t}}{\partial Q_{i,t}} = \frac{C_{i,t}}{Q_{i,t}}\left( {\alpha_{1} + 2\alpha_{2}\ln Q_{i,t} + \sum\limits_{j = 1}^{3}\gamma_{j}\ln w_{i,t}^{j}} \right).$$

With the marginal cost obtained from model [(4)](#fo0025){ref-type="disp-formula"}, the Lerner index is calculated with the formula specified in model [(2)](#fo0010){ref-type="disp-formula"}.

### 3.3.2. Measurement of foreign bank entry {#s0040}

I measure the degree of foreign bank presence with two alternative variables: the number and the assets of foreign banks, as percentages of the total number and total assets of banks in the given country, respectively. Here foreign banks are defined as banks with at least 50% of their shares owned by foreigners. [@bb0100] compile the data, which cover 1995--2013 for foreign bank numbers and 2004--2013 for foreign bank assets.

### 3.3.3. Control variables {#s0045}

I first control for bank-specific characteristics that may have some impact on bank market power. *Bank assets* (i.e., the natural logarithm of total assets) is used to measure bank size to reflect economies of scale, as larger banks may have higher market power. *Capital asset ratio* proxies for capital adequacy, *loan share* (i.e., loans-to-assets ratio) for bank asset structure and business orientation, *Z score* for bank risk, the percentage annual growth in total assets for *asset growth*, *return on assets* for profitability, and *overhead costs* (i.e., the ratio of noninterest costs to average assets) for bank efficiency.

The *Z score* for bank *i* in year *t* is constructed as $Z_{\mathit{it}} = \frac{\mathit{ROA}_{\mathit{it}} + \mathit{CAR}_{\mathit{it}}}{\sigma_{\mathit{ROA}_{i}}}$, where *ROA* ~*it*~ represents return on assets for bank *i* in year *t*, *CAR* ~*it*~ capital-to-asset ratio for bank *i* in year *t*, and *σ* ~*ROA*~*i*~~ standard deviation of return on assets for bank *i*, which is calculated only for banks with at least four consecutive years of data.

Second, the market structure of a banking system can be a determinant of bank market power, and market concentration is a common measure of market structure. Banks are expected to have larger market power in a more concentrated banking market. I control for market structure with a concentration measure, HHI, defined as the sum of the squared market shares of total assets held by each bank in the host countries\' banking market, with higher value indicating more concentration.[8](#fn0040){ref-type="fn"}

Third, I use stock market capitalization to measure the development of the stock market and the general level of financial development in a country (see, e.g., [@bb0175]). Stock market capitalization is defined as the value of listed shares as a fraction of GDP. As the stock market substitutes for banks in providing financing services, banks tend to have less market power in countries with more developed stock markets.

Fourth, I use GDP per capita and GDP growth rate to control for the economic condition of the host country. Fifth, I also control for a country\'s legal environment and governance with rule of law, which captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. By construction, rule of law ranges from approximately −2.5 to 2.5, with higher values representing stronger governance. Last, I include a crisis dummy in the regressions to take into consideration the economic cycle. It takes on the value one if a systemic crisis is observed in a particular year or zero otherwise. [@bb0005] observe that bank price power is procyclical: the Lerner index declined after the onset of the global financial crisis, perhaps because bank profits eroded during the crisis. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"} , and the summary statistics of the variables are displayed in [Table 2](#t0010){ref-type="table"} .Table 1Variable definitions and data sources.Table 1VariablesDefinitionData source*Dependent variable*The Lerner indexThe Lerner index measures a bank\'s market power by calculating the deviation between output price and marginal cost, with higher values indicating higher market power of a bank and less bank competition.Calculated with data from Bankscope  *Bank globalization measures*Foreign bank assetsThe percentage of the total banking assets that are held by foreign banksWorld Bank Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)Foreign bank numbersThe number of foreign-owned banks as a percentage of the total number of banks in an economy  *Bank characteristics*Bank assetsThe logarithm of bank assets in million U.S. dollars, to proxy for bank sizeBankscopeCapital asset ratioRatio of equity capital to bank assets, to measure capital adequacyLoan shareThe ratio of loans to total assets, to proxy for a bank\'s business orientationZ scoreA measure of bank risk. It is calculated with Z~it~ = (ROA~it~ + CAR~it~) / σ~ROAi~, where ROA~it~ represents return on assets for bank *i* in year *t*, CAR~it~ capital asset ratio for bank *i* in year *t*, σ~ROAi~ standard deviation of return on assets for bank *i*.Calculated with data from BankscopeAsset growthPercentage annual growth in bank total assetsBankscopeOverhead costsNoninterest expense as a percentage of total assets, a measure of bank efficiency  *Macroeconomic variables*GDP per capitaA country\'s GDP per capita in thousands 2005 constant U.S. dollarsWorld Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)GDP growthThe growth rate of a country\'s GDP in percentage  *Market structure and financial development variables*HHIHerfindahl-Hirschman index, defined as the sum of the squares of bank market shares, a measure of bank market concentrationCalculated with data from BankscopeStock market capitalizationThe value of listed shares as a share of GDPWorld Bank Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)  *Legal environment variable*Rule of lawPerceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of societyWorld Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)  *Regulatory and institutional variables*Activity restrictionsRange of fee-generating activities banks can participant in; ranges from 3 to 12, with higher values indicating more restrictive regulations.Bank Regulation and Supervision Database, [@bb0020] and [@bb0090], [@bb0025]Capital stringencyThe strength of capital regulation in a country; ranges from 0 to 10, with higher value indicating greater stringency.Multiple supervisorsDummy equal to one when there are multiple supervisorsExternal governanceThe effectiveness of external audits, the transparency of financial statements and evaluations by rating agencies, and incentives for creditors to monitor bank performance; ranges from 0 to 19, with higher value indicating better governance.Government banksPercentage of government-owned banks in the banking systemLimitations on foreign banksWhether foreign banks may own domestic banks and whether foreign banks may enter a country\'s banking industry; ranges from 0 to 4, with lower value indicating greater stringency.Applications deniedThe fraction of the applications to enter banking that are deniedDepth of information sharingStrength of the information content of the credit bureaus; ranges from 0 to 8, with a higher value indicating that more information is available.Doing Business database (DB)  *Economic cycle variable*CrisisDummy equal to one when a systemic crisis is observed in a particular year, and zero otherwiseWorld Bank Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)Table 2Summary statistics of variables.Table 2VariableNo. of observationsMeanStandard deviationMinimumMaximumLerner index99,9530.1570.186−0.9470.579Foreign bank numbers102,00723.19017.283096Foreign bank assets73,07416.20415.166192Bank assets101,4766.2741.7222.03111.210Capital asset ratio100,97210.3227.7152.05077Loan share101,3370.5870.1750.00010.922Z score95,91538.61936.8341.667231.738Asset growth94,9359.00918.722−30.100142.200Return on assets100,5320.6081.155−5.8406.680Overhead costs100,4504.3334.6060.34043.490HHI102,0070.1280.1500.0130.99999Stock market capitalization89,55768.54843.5340.345570.155GDP per capita101,71632.09415.9840.21586.127GDP growth101,9031.8223.128−14.81434.500Rule of law99,5231.0830.910−1.8421.9996Crisis80,8810.4340.49601Activity restrictions101,6246.5881.8923.33312Capital stringency95,9486.9330.924210Multiple supervisors101,5530.5100.43401External governance68,79213.8521.904917.5Limitations on foreign banks101,1613.8890.32524Applications denied91,4860.0450.11400.893Government banks101,38119.76420.050092.890Depth of information sharing101,7417.2341.42708[^1]

The dependent variable, the Lerner index, ranges from −0.947 to 0.579, with a mean of 0.157. On average, 23.19% of the banks in the host countries are foreign banks, and they account for 16.204% of total bank assets. The logarithm of bank assets in million U.S. dollars ranges from 2.031 to 11.21, with a mean of 6.274. The average capital asset ratio and loan share are 10.322% and 58.7%, respectively. The Z score for the measure of bank insolvency risk ranges from 1.667 to 231.738, with an average of 38.619. Over the sample period, the average growth rate of bank assets is 9.009%, return on assets 60.8%, and overhead cost 4.333% of bank assets. The bank concentration measure HHI averages 0.128. The average stock market capitalization is 68.548%, ranging from 0.345% to 570.155%. Over the sample period, the average GDP per capita of all the countries in the sample is 32,094 U.S. dollars, and the average GDP growth rate is 1.822%. Rule of law averages 1.083, and the economic cycle crisis dummy averages 0.434.

4. Empirical results {#s0050}
====================

4.1. Baseline results on the link between foreign bank presence and bank competition {#s0055}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To find the average relationship between foreign bank presence and bank competition in the host countries, I run regressions of bank market power (i.e., the Lerner index) on foreign bank numbers and foreign bank assets, controlling for the bank- and country-level variables as model [(1)](#fo0005){ref-type="disp-formula"} specifies. Since my focus is on the impact of foreign bank presence on domestic banks, the regression results reported in [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"} below are calculated with domestic banks only.Table 3Foreign bank presence and bank competition.Table 3Dependent variable: Lerner index(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)Foreign bank numbers−0.0010[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0015[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0024[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0005)Foreign bank assets−0.0000−0.0005[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0009[⁎](#tf0005){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0002)(0.0002)(0.0005)Bank assets0.0186[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0171[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0573[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0236[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0229[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0506[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0010)(0.0010)(0.0063)(0.0010)(0.0010)(0.0064)Capital asset ratio0.0009[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0006[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0038[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}0.00040.00020.0036[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0003)(0.0003)(0.0016)(0.0003)(0.0003)(0.0015)Loan share0.1467[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.1437[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.1424[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.1889[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.1939[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0894[⁎](#tf0005){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0083)(0.0084)(0.0493)(0.0092)(0.0094)(0.0505)Z score0.0001[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.00000.00070.0002[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0002[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0004(0.0000)(0.0000)(0.0005)(0.0000)(0.0000)(0.0005)Asset growth0.00000.0001[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.00020.00010.0001[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0005[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0000)(0.0000)(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0002)Return on assets0.0618[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0621[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0502[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0655[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0656[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0539[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0014)(0.0014)(0.0087)(0.0015)(0.0015)(0.0099)Overhead costs−0.0076[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0089[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0006−0.0075[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0083[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0000(0.0005)(0.0005)(0.0027)(0.0004)(0.0005)(0.0025)HHI0.0627[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0584[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0578[⁎](#tf0005){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0281[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0140−0.0540(0.0112)(0.0116)(0.0332)(0.0123)(0.0138)(0.0346)Stock market capitalization−0.0002[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0000−0.0000−0.0003[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0002[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0006[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0000)(0.0000)(0.0003)(0.0000)(0.0000)(0.0003)GDP per capita0.0013[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0002−0.00530.0006[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.00040.0335[⁎](#tf0005){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0003)(0.0002)(0.0229)(0.0003)(0.0003)(0.0188)GDP growth−0.0014[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0020[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0032−0.00100.0010−0.0031(0.0007)(0.0006)(0.0020)(0.0006)(0.0006)(0.0025)Rule of law−0.0306[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0184[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.2496[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0240[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0147[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.1908[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0040)(0.0039)(0.0255)(0.0042)(0.0044)(0.0246)Crisis−0.0156[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0128[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.1260[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0118[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0295[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0015){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.1275[⁎⁎](#tf0010){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0041)(0.0041)(0.0335)(0.0047)(0.0053)(0.0515)N56,76055,378138239,41738,4141003R-sq0.2420.2510.6760.2770.2810.487Year fixed effect?YesYesYesYesYesYesClusteringBankBankBankBankBankBank[^2][^3][^4][^5]

Columns 1--3 of [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"} display the regression results with foreign bank numbers and columns 4--6 with foreign bank assets. Column 1 of [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"} reveals that an increase in the number of foreign banks is associated with a decrease in bank market power, suggesting more competition in the host countries. The same relationship appears in column 2 for developed countries. However, the evidence for developing countries in column 3 is the opposite---the number of foreign banks is positively associated with the Lerner index, indicating that foreign bank entry reduces bank competition in developing countries. With foreign bank assets as a proxy for foreign bank presence, although column 4 does not show significant impact for all countries, columns 5 and 6 do show that foreign bank presence is significantly associated with more competition in developed, but lower competition in developing countries. Specifically, the estimates presented in column 1 with all countries included imply that on average a 1% increase in the proportion of foreign banks reduces the Lerner index by 0.1%. With the same 1% increase in foreign bank numbers, column 2 shows a 0.15% decrease in the Lerner index for developed countries, while column 3 indicates a 0.24% increase for developing countries. The impact of foreign bank assets is much smaller. Columns 5 and 6 show that a 1% increase in foreign bank assets is associated with a 0.05% reduction and a 0.09% increase in the Lerner index for developed and developing countries, respectively.

When foreign banks establish wholly new operations in the host country, their entry tends to increase the number of competitors and consequently the degree of competition. However, when foreign banks merge with or acquire local banks, their entry increases foreign bank assets but not necessarily the number of banks in the host countries. In some cases, the resulting consolidation could even reduce the number of banks in a country and decrease competition. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that foreign bank numbers exert a more prominent impact on bank competition than foreign bank assets.

The evidence that foreign bank entry into developing countries is associated with higher market power of incumbent domestic banks seems counterintuitive, but there are a few plausible explanations. First, foreign banks enter developing countries with innovative services, generally at lower cost than domestic banks. Therefore, foreign bank entry often creates great competitive pressure on local banks to consolidate to reach a scale at which they can compete with the foreign banks ([@bb0145]). Such consolidation could reduce bank competition in the host country. Second, global banks and local banks have different customer bases. Global banks tend to focus on the largest corporate customers that need sophisticated fee-generating services such as security underwriting, derivative trading, foreign exchange trading and risk management, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions, along with some traditional banking services, while local banks\' main customers are individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, foreign banks tend to complement the banking services of the locally oriented domestic banks instead of replacing them ([@bb0145]). Third, foreign banks tend to rely more heavily on money market funding while local banks use the money market less. As a result, foreign banks may not need to compete with local banks head to head for deposits, and their cost structure could be very different as well. Fourth, very often foreign banks enter developing countries with banking problems by purchasing an existing bank or forming a joint venture, which does not increase the number of banks in the country. For example, [@bb0135] finds that after the Asian financial crisis, the increase in foreign ownership did not increase competition; indeed, various models in this study show declines in competition. Levy-[@bb0205] conclude that foreign bank presence weakens competition in Latin America countries. Fifth, foreign banks, particularly those from advanced economies, may bring in more sophisticated banking techniques and technology that reduce the cost of financial intermediation ([@bb0070]; [@bb0140]), and may also bring in more efficient management skills, which are transferred to domestic banks through knowledge spillover within the banking industry. This resource transfer may increase the market power of banks in the host countries. Numerous studies have found that foreign participation improves bank efficiency (e.g., [@bb0035]; [@bb0045]; [@bb0190]). Lastly, some cross-country studies find that foreign banks have relatively higher interest margins and profitability and lower overhead costs in developing countries ([@bb0110]; [@bb0150]). The data employed in the present study also show that the net interest margins of foreign banks in developing countries are significantly larger than those of the incumbent domestic banks, and the case is the opposite for developed countries. Therefore, it is likely that pricing by large multinational banks legitimates increased spreads that benefit local banks.

The bank characteristic variables also show significant relationships with bank market power. First, larger banks have higher market power, reflecting their economy of scale. Second, the capital asset ratio is positively associated with the Lerner index, in line with [@bb0125] observation that competition is less intense in markets dominated by well-capitalized banks. Third, the coefficients on loan share and Z score are always positive and mostly significant, indicating that banks that focus on traditional loan-making and those with less insolvency risk tend to have more market power. Fourth, the coefficients of asset growth are positive and significant in all regressions in [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"}, providing strong evidence that banks that grow faster have more market power. Fifth, return on assets is positively associated with market power. Last, the negative and statistically significant coefficients of overhead costs suggest that less efficient banks have lower market power.

As a measure of market structure, the HHI is positively associated with bank market power overall and for developed countries, indicating that a more concentrated market dominated by a few large banks tends to be less competitive. However, there is weak evidence to the contrary for developing countries. The negative and significant coefficients of stock market capitalization seem to suggest that a more developed substitute for bank credit makes banks lose market power and increases competition in the banking industry. This is opposite to the evidence found by [@bb0125] from the emerging Asian and Latin American banking markets. With all countries included, columns 1 and 4 show a positive relationship between GDP per capita and bank market power; nevertheless, no significant relationship appears for developed countries, and only a weak positive relationship emerges for developing countries when foreign bank assets proxy for foreign bank presence in column 6. There is no clear relationship between GDP growth and market power, with a negative coefficient for all countries in column 1, a positive coefficient for developed countries in column 2, and insignificant coefficients in other columns. Bank market power decreases as rule of law increases, indicating that competition is more intense in countries with better governance. The coefficients for the crisis dummy are all negative and significant, providing strong evidence of procyclicality in bank price power and corroborating the evidence documented by [@bb0005] that the Lerner index declined after the onset of the global financial crisis.

4.2. Conditional correlations between bank market power and foreign bank presence {#s0060}
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The baseline results discussed above indicate that foreign bank presence increases competition in developed countries, but decreases it in developing ones. To examine this difference further, I modify the baseline model by removing the country-level control variables and run regressions for each country separately with model [(5)](#fo0030){ref-type="disp-formula"} as specified below:$$\mathit{Competition}_{i,j,t} = c + \beta_{j} \bullet \mathit{foreign\ presence}_{j,t - 1} + \gamma \bullet X_{i,j,t - 1} + \mathit{year\ dummies} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}.$$

Variable definitions are the same as those in model [(1)](#fo0005){ref-type="disp-formula"}, and the coefficient of interest is *β* ~*j*~, which represents the impact of foreign bank presence on bank competition of country *j*. [Fig. 1](#f0005){ref-type="fig"}, [Fig. 2](#f0010){ref-type="fig"} display the conditional correlations between foreign bank presence measures and bank market power, given controls for bank characteristics.Fig. 1Conditional correlations of foreign bank numbers and bank market power. This chart shows the impact of foreign bank presence as measured with foreign bank numbers on bank industry competition estimated with bank market power. The X axis shows the country code, and the Y axis shows the coefficient *β*~*j*~ in model [(5)](#fo0030){ref-type="disp-formula"}.Fig. 1Fig. 2Conditional correlations of foreign bank assets and bank market power. This chart shows the impact of foreign bank presence as measured with foreign bank assets on bank industry competition estimated with bank market power. The X axis shows the country code, and the Y axis shows the coefficient *β*~*j*~ in model [(4)](#fo0025){ref-type="disp-formula"}.Fig. 2

[Fig. 1](#f0005){ref-type="fig"} shows that the impact of foreign bank numbers on bank competition varies greatly across countries, ranging from −0.11 for Egypt to 0.13 for Burkina Faso, and [Fig. 2](#f0010){ref-type="fig"} shows that the impact of foreign bank assets ranges from −0.22 for Serbia to 0.09 for Kuwait. This substantial variation explains why foreign bank assets do not significantly influence the Lerner index when all countries are included in the sample (i.e., in column 4 of [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"}): the negative and positive effects cancel each other out.

4.3. Heterogeneous effects of foreign bank presence on competition {#s0065}
------------------------------------------------------------------

Jointly, [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"} and [Fig. 1](#f0005){ref-type="fig"}, [Fig. 2](#f0010){ref-type="fig"} imply that the relationship between foreign bank presence and competition may depend on country-level factors beyond the country\'s level of economic development. In this section, I explore these potential factors.

### 4.3.1. Foreign bank presence and competition, with controls for bank regulatory and institutional framework {#s0070}

The regulatory and institutional framework in which banks operate can influence the degree of bank competition and the link between competition and foreign bank presence. I reexamine the relationship while controlling for various factors considered in other studies (e.g., [@bb0210]): bank regulation (activity restrictions, capital stringency), supervision (multiple bank supervisors, external governance), market entry policy (limitations on foreign banks, applications denied), bank market structure (government banks), and institutional development (the depth of information sharing). The data are retrieved from various databases of the World Bank.[9](#fn0045){ref-type="fn"} [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"} defines these variables and lists data sources, and [Table 2](#t0010){ref-type="table"} displays their summary statistics.

[Table 4](#t0020){ref-type="table"} shows the averages of the regulatory and institutional variables by income group. *t-*Tests show that all these variables differ significantly between developed and developing countries.[10](#fn0050){ref-type="fn"} On average, developing countries have greater activity restrictions and more stringent capital requirements, but their supervision is weaker than in developed countries: fewer developing-country banks have multiple supervisors, and they have less external governance. Developing countries tend to put more limitations on foreign banks and deny more applications. They also have more government-owned bank assets. Their credit registries contain less information than those in developed countries.[11](#fn0055){ref-type="fn"} Do these differences affect the relationship between foreign bank entry and competition?Table 4Summary statistics of bank regulatory and institutional variables by income group.Table 4Regulatory and institutional variablesDeveloping countriesDeveloped countriesOverallActivity restrictions8.2066.5196.594Capital stringency7.4526.9186.941Multiple supervisors0.0200.5400.517External governance13.77613.86013.856Limitations on foreign banks3.6353.9023.891Applications denied0.3580.0340.044Government banks29.28619.20419.637Depth of information sharing4.8647.3597.245[^6]

[Table 5](#t0025){ref-type="table"} shows the correlation matrix of the bank regulatory and institutional variables. All these variables are significantly correlated with each other. For example, multiple supervisors and external governance both measure the effectiveness of bank supervision and governance, and thus are positively correlated.Table 5Correlation matrix of bank regulatory and institutional variables.Table 5Activity restrictionsCapital stringencyMultiple supervisorsExternal governanceLimitations on foreign banksApplications deniedGovernment banksDepth of information sharingActivity restrictions1Capital stringency0.2591*0*Multiple supervisors0.07740.31571*00*External governance−0.2026−0.05010.53411*000*Limitations on foreign banks0.0158−0.01750.36790.70891*0000*Applications denied0.1993−0.1463−0.4519−0.247−0.08741*00000*Government banks−0.6025−0.1242−0.161−0.076−0.28150.14791*000000*Depth of information sharing−0.05610.08650.60820.21430.2192−0.24850.11281*0000000*[^7]

Given these correlations, to minimize the effect of multicollinearity, I add the regulatory and institutional variables to the regressions one by one as well as all together, and report the estimates in [Table 6](#t0030){ref-type="table"} . For brevity, the estimates for the other control variables are not reported.Table 6Foreign bank presence and bank competition, with controls for bank regulatory and institutional framework.Table 6Dependent variable: Lerner index(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)Foreign bank numbers−0.0010[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0002−0.0005[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0004[⁎⁎](#tf0025){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0010[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0016[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0011[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0008[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0008[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0002)Activity restrictions−0.00150.0097[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0010)(0.0030)Capital stringency−0.0326[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0214[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0023)(0.0034)Multiple supervisors−0.0437[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}0.1365[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0061)(0.0220)External governance0.0190[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0084[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0017)(0.0027)Limitations on foreign banks−0.00170.0022(0.0080)(0.0119)Applications denied−0.2590[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.1182[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0274)(0.0282)Government banks−0.0005[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0015[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0001)(0.0003)Depth of information sharing−0.0137[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0030){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0081[⁎⁎](#tf0025){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0013)(0.0041)N56,72553,37956,72537,85456,61253,57156,64256,72932,078R-sq0.2420.2640.2440.1650.2430.2550.2440.2450.196Year fixed effect?YesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesClusteringBankBankBankBankBankBankBankBankBank[^8][^9][^10]

[Table 6](#t0030){ref-type="table"} shows that the coefficients for foreign bank numbers are all negative and mostly significant at the 10% level or more, even after all the regulatory and institutional variables are added (column 9), providing further evidence that on average foreign bank entry increases bank competition in the host countries. Although the coefficient for activity restrictions is insignificant in column 1, it is positive and significant at the 1% level in the all-in-one regression in column 9, suggesting that the average bank market power is higher in countries with more activity restrictions. The negative and significant coefficients for capital stringency in columns 2 and 9 provide strong evidence that stringent capital requirements are associated with lower market power (i.e., more competition). The evidence concerning multiple supervisors is inconclusive, with opposite and significant coefficients in columns 3 and 9. Effective external governance is linked to more market power. The negative coefficients for applications denied suggest that bank market power is lower in countries with higher barriers to market entry. Similar relationships are found for the presence of government banks and for depth of information sharing.

### 4.3.2. Bank regulatory and institutional framework and the foreign bank presence--competition link {#s0075}

To elucidate how the bank regulatory and institutional framework of host countries influences the foreign bank entry--competition link, I add interaction terms between foreign bank numbers and the bank regulatory and institutional variables to the regressions and report the estimates in [Table 7](#t0035){ref-type="table"} .Table 7Foreign bank presence, bank competition, and the regulatory and institutional framework.Table 7Dependent variable: Lerner index(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)Foreign bank numbers0.0032[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0054[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.00000.0089[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0047[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0021[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0019[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0015[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0104[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0006)(0.0007)(0.0002)(0.0017)(0.0016)(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0002)(0.0031)Activity restrictions0.0102[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0077[⁎](#tf0035){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0022)(0.0047)Foreign bank numbers × activity restrictions−0.0006[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0001(0.0001)(0.0002)Capital stringency−0.0466[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0417[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0029)(0.0051)Foreign bank numbers × capital stringency0.0008[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0008[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0001)(0.0002)Multiple supervisors0.01780.1234[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0123)(0.0419)Foreign bank numbers × multiple supervisors−0.0027[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0004(0.0004)(0.0012)External governance0.0346[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0129[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0033)(0.0042)Foreign bank numbers × external governance−0.0007[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0004[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0001)(0.0001)Limitations on foreign banks0.0284[⁎⁎](#tf0040){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0460[⁎⁎](#tf0040){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0116)(0.0200)Foreign bank numbers × limitations on foreign banks−0.0014[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0017[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0004)(0.0006)Applications denied−0.4251[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.1866[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0331)(0.0669)Foreign bank numbers × applications denied0.0087[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0040[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0008)(0.0014)Government banks−0.0020[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0013[⁎⁎](#tf0040){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0002)(0.0006)Foreign bank numbers × government banks0.0001[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0000(0.0000)(0.0000)Depth of information sharing−0.0182[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}−0.0208[⁎⁎⁎](#tf0045){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0024)(0.0066)Foreign bank numbers × depth of information sharing0.0001[⁎⁎](#tf0040){ref-type="table-fn"}0.0002[⁎⁎](#tf0040){ref-type="table-fn"}(0.0000)(0.0001)N56,72553,37956,72537,85456,61253,57156,64256,72932,078R-sq0.2450.2670.2470.1690.2430.2600.2500.2450.206Year fixed effect?YesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesClusteringBankBankBankBankBankBankBankBankBank[^11][^12][^13][^14]

In [Table 7](#t0035){ref-type="table"}, most of the coefficients for foreign bank numbers are negative except for columns 1, 4, and 5. The relationships are generally the same as in [Table 6](#t0030){ref-type="table"} except for multiple supervisors, which is positively associated with market power in both column 3 and column 9, suggesting that bank market power tends to be higher in countries with more than one official supervisor. Columns 2 and 9 show strong evidence that stringent capital requirements mitigate the negative impact of foreign bank presence on market power. The negative coefficient for the interaction term of foreign bank numbers and multiple supervisors is significant at the 1% level in column 3, but the relationship turns insignificant in column 9, providing weak evidence that banks in countries with multiple supervisors lose more market power with foreign bank entry. A similar relationship is found for external governance. A higher proportion of applications denied (a measure of market entry barriers) mitigates the impact of foreign bank entry on bank market power. The coefficient for the interaction term in column 7 is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that foreign bank entry imposes less impact on countries with more government-owned assets. However, the coefficient loses significance in column 9, probably owing to multicollinearity. The positive and significant coefficients for the interaction terms in columns 8 and 9 provide strong evidence that more effective information sharing can alleviate the impact of foreign bank entry. [Table 7](#t0035){ref-type="table"} does not show consistent evidence on whether (and how) limitations on foreign banks affect the relationship between foreign bank presence and host countries\' level of competition.

4.4. Robustness exercises {#s0080}
-------------------------

To check whether the main finding---that foreign bank entry increases bank competition in the host country---is robust across business cycles. I modify model [(1)](#fo0005){ref-type="disp-formula"} by adding an interaction term between foreign bank numbers and the crisis dummy. The regression results show the same negative coefficient for foreign bank numbers, supporting the previous evidence. The coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level, implying that the impact of foreign bank entry on competition is more pronounced during crises.

In [Table 6](#t0030){ref-type="table"}, [Table 7](#t0035){ref-type="table"}, I use foreign bank numbers as the main proxy for foreign bank presence, because the data for numbers cover a longer time span (1995--2013) than the data for assets (2004--2013). To check robustness, I replicate the regressions of [Table 6](#t0030){ref-type="table"}, [Table 7](#t0035){ref-type="table"} with foreign bank assets. The coefficients are less significant, a fact that is no surprise as it is in line with the evidence in [Table 3](#t0015){ref-type="table"}. However, the relationships between the regulatory and institutional variables and bank market power are otherwise consistent with those reported in [Table 6](#t0030){ref-type="table"}. Similarly, the evidence from replicating [Table 7](#t0035){ref-type="table"} while substituting foreign bank assets for foreign bank numbers is also consistent with that presented earlier, except that the variable for government-owned banks loses its significance.[12](#fn0060){ref-type="fn"}

5. Summary and conclusions {#s0085}
==========================

This study implies that foreign bank entry in the form of de novo investment that increases the number of banks also increases bank competition, but entry through mergers or acquisitions may not do so. Also, foreign bank presence increases competition in developed countries but decreases it in developing ones.

Of course, the host country\'s regulatory and institutional environment matters: bank competition is higher in countries with fewer activity restrictions, more stringent capital requirements, more applications denied and more government-owned bank assets, and lower in countries that require multiple supervisors and/or external governance. Good sharing of credit information reduces information asymmetry and increases bank competition.

The regulatory and institutional environment also affects the impact of foreign bank entry on competition. I find strong evidence that stringent capital requirements, higher market entry barriers, and more effective information sharing can all mitigate the impact of foreign bank entry on competition in the host countries. On the other hand, foreign bank presence exerts a more pronounced impact on bank competition in countries with more effective supervision and external governance. The economic cycle also plays a role: foreign banks have more impact during crises.

Besides the major findings above, evidence shows that larger banks have more market power, reflecting economies of scale. Banks also have higher market power if they hold more capital, focus on traditional loan business, have less insolvency risk, and are more profitable. Less efficient banks with more overhead costs tend to have lower market power. In general, the banking system is more competitive in countries with a more developed financial market and better governance, and during financial crises.

The findings from this study have important policy implications. First, the finding that bank market power is less affected by foreign bank entry under more stringent capital requirements provides additional justification for these regulations, which are mostly aimed at ensuring financial stability. Second, the evidence that foreign bank entry has less impact on the banks of countries with higher market entry barriers implies that such barriers help the extant banks survive the increased competition. Third, this study supports the importance of developing an effective credit information sharing system, which increases banking competition but also alleviates the impact of foreign banks on the incumbent domestic banks.
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The results remain the same with 1-year lag terms for the country-level variables, which do not change substantially from the year before.
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By construction, limitations on foreign banks gauge the number of activities that foreign banks are allowed to take. Therefore, a lower value of the variable indicates more restrictions on foreign banks.
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[^1]: Notes: Although most variables are in ratios or indexes, bank assets is the logarithm of bank assets in million U.S. dollars, and GDP per capita is in thousand U.S. dollars. Detailed definitions of variables and data sources are shown in [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}.

[^2]: Notes: All regressions control for bank characteristics and for macroeconomic, market structure, legal environment, and economic cycle variables with year fixed effects and clustering at bank level. To mitigate the potential endogeneity issues in determining the degree of bank competition, 1-year lag terms for all bank characteristic variables are used in the regressions. According to the World Bank\'s income classifications, developed countries include high-income and upper-middle-income countries, while developing countries include lower-middle-income and low-income ones. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}. Standard errors are given in parentheses.

[^3]: Significance at 10%.

[^4]: Significance at 5%.

[^5]: Significance at 1%.

[^6]: Notes: The differences in these variables between developed and developing countries are all statistically significant. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}.

[^7]: Note: Variable definitions and data sources are reported in [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}. *P* values are in italics.

[^8]: Note: All regressions control for bank characteristics and for macroeconomic, market structure, legal environment, economic cycle, and regulatory and institutional variables, with year fixed effects and clustering at bank level. To mitigate the potential endogeneity issues in determining the degree of bank competition, 1-year lag terms for all bank characteristic variables are used in the regressions. Results for the control variables are suppressed for brevity. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

[^9]: Significance at 5%.

[^10]: Significance at 1%.

[^11]: Notes: All regressions control for bank characteristics and for macroeconomic, market structure, legal environment, economic cycle, regulatory and institutional variables, and the interactions between the regulatory/institutional variables and foreign bank numbers, with year fixed effects and clustering at bank level. To mitigate the potential endogeneity issues in determining the degree of bank competition, 1-year lag terms for all bank characteristic variables are used in the regressions. Results for the control variables are suppressed for brevity. Variable definitions and data sources are reported in [Table 1](#t0005){ref-type="table"}. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

[^12]: Significance at 10%.

[^13]: Significance at 5%.

[^14]: Significance at 1%.
